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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
     This case raises the question of what constitutes "cause" 
for the purpose of dismissing a petition under Chapter 13 of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Code.  The appellant, Ernest R. Lilley, Jr., 
filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 
11 U.S.C.  1 et seq., to discharge a debt incurred as a result 
of his willful failure to pay personal income taxes over a period 
of several years.  The Internal Revenue Service filed a motion to 
dismiss the petition on the ground that Mr. Lilley's prepetition 
conduct was cause for dismissal under the statute.  The 
bankruptcy court rejected the agency's argument, but on appeal 
the district court reversed, granting the motion to dismiss for 
cause. 
     Mr. Lilley now appeals the district court's holding.   
 
                 I. Facts and procedural posture 
 
     The unusual chain of events that led to the instant case 
goes back a quarter of a century.  In 1970, Ernest R. Lilley, Jr. 
formed Mintmaster, Inc., a corporation which minted and sold 
gold, silver and bronze medallions and jewelry.  In January 1971, 
the United States Secret Service seized the assets of Mr. 
Lilley's business in the mistaken belief that Mr. Lilley was 
unlawfully engaged in counterfeiting activities.  After several 
months, the Secret Service determined that Mr. Lilley, in fact, 
had not engaged in any unlawful activity, and returned his assets 
to him.  Shortly thereafter, however, Mr. Lilley's business 
deteriorated and ultimately failed, a loss that Mr. Lilley 
attributed to the seizure of his assets. 
     Mr. Lilley was unable to obtain monetary redress from the 
Secret Service for the loss which he believed it had caused.  He 
turned to self-help instead and, as he describes it, "decided to 
recoup his losses by refusing to pay his future federal income 
taxes."  Appellant's Brief at 3.  He secured employment as a 
night watchman in 1974, and became director of security for a 
shopping mall in 1977.  In both positions, he filed federal tax 
withholding forms on which he falsely claimed that he was exempt 
from withholding, as a result of which no federal income tax 
money was withheld from his wages -- though he did allow state 
income taxes and FICA taxes to be withheld.  By 1980 he had 
become public relations and marketing manager for the mall and 
started his own business. 
     In 1983, Mr. Lilley was convicted in federal court of 
willful failure to file tax returns for 1976 through 1979, and 
served a one-year prison sentence.  As part of his probation, he 
was required to file his delinquent tax returns for 1974 through 
1984, but he did not do so until September 1985, when he was 
faced with a violation of his probation.  By that point, he had 
amassed $178,000 in federal delinquent tax debt and additions.  
Mr. Lilley eventually filed a petition with the United States Tax 
Court arguing that his failure to file income tax returns was due 
to both mental illness and, for the years 1980 to 1984, advice of 
counsel.  The court denied the petition on the ground that Mr. 
Lilley had acted with willful neglect, not reasonable cause, in 
failing to file his returns from 1980 to 1984, and that he had 
acted negligently with intentional disregard of IRS rules and 
regulations so as to warrant imposition of additions to taxes 
owed from 1974 through 1984. 
     On April 17, 1992, Mr. Lilley filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania seeking discharge of his tax debt, and 
identifying the IRS as his only creditor.  A year later, and 
after numerous legal maneuvers, the bankruptcy court found that 
Mr. Lilley had willfully attempted to evade or defeat his tax 
obligation and that 11 U.S.C.  523(a)(1)(C) precluded discharge 
of the debt.  In re Lilley, 152 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993). 
     Subsequent statutory developments opened new avenues for Mr. 
Lilley to seek discharge of his tax debt.  Section 108(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4104, 
amended 11 U.S.C.  109(e) to increase the unsecured debt limit 
in a Chapter 13 proceeding to $250,000 for cases filed after 
October 22, 1994.  This change made Chapter 13 available to Mr. 
Lilley for the first time, and on November 21, 1994 he filed the 
instant petition seeking discharge of his federal income tax 
obligation. 
     At the time of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing, Mr. Lilley 
was 66 years old, in poor health and disabled.  The schedules 
filed in this proceeding indicate that he had no real or personal 
property, that his sole creditor was the IRS, and that his sole 
income was monthly Social Security benefits of $904.  He claimed, 
and the IRS did not dispute, that his monthly expenses amounted 
to $854.  Mr. Lilley's plan proposed payments to the IRS of the 
balance -- or $50 per month -- for thirty-six months, for a total 
of $1800.  The filings indicate total tax indebtedness to the IRS 
of $178,000.  The IRS contends that "[m]ost of the proposed 
payments would be consumed by attorney's fees, with the IRS 
receiving very little on its claim."  Appellee's Brief at 8. 
     The IRS filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Lilley's petition on 
the ground that it was filed in bad faith in violation of 11 
U.S.C.  1307(c).  The IRS also objected to confirmation of Mr. 
Lilley's plan, asserting that the plan "has not been proposed in 
good faith" in violation of 11 U.S.C.  1325(a)(3).  Appendix at 
39.  In response, Mr. Lilley filed an adversary proceeding 
seeking a declaration that his indebtedness to the IRS for 
delinquent personal income taxes for the years 1976 through 1984, 
totalling $178,000, was neither a priority nor a secured debt and 
was totally dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.  1328(a).  The IRS 
subsequently conceded that Mr. Lilley's tax indebtedness was not 
a priority debt and was not secured at the time of the Chapter 13 
filing. 
     The bankruptcy court issued its opinion and order on May 3, 
1995.  In re Lilley, 181 B.R. 809 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) 
[hereinafter Lilley II].  First, the court denied the IRS's 
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no good faith 
filing requirement in Chapter 13 cases.  Id. at 811.  Second, the 
court denied the agency's objections to confirmation on the 
ground that Mr. Lilley was not in violation of the good faith or 
illegality requirement for plan confirmation found in  
1325(a)(3).  Id. at 813.  The court concluded that "[t]he 
Debtor's plan will therefore be confirmed."  Id. at 814. 
     The IRS appealed the bankruptcy court's determination to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  The district court reversed, holding that Mr. 
Lilley's attempt "to defraud the Government by intentionally 
evading payment of his federal income taxes constitutes cause for 
dismissal of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition pursuant to 11 
U.S.C.  1307(c)."  In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489, 494 (Dist. E.D. 
Pa. 1995) (mem.) [hereinafter Lilley III].  The court further 
held that "the bankruptcy court's finding of good faith [under  
1325(a)(3)] is supported by the record and cannot be deemed 
clearly erroneous."  Id. at 495. 
     Mr. Lilley now appeals the district court's determination.  
He argues that the court erred when it considered his prepetition 
conduct under section 1307(c).  He further argues, in the 
alternative, that if the debtor's prepetition conduct is relevant 
to a dismissal for cause under section 1307(c), it is only one 
factor which should be considered by the bankruptcy court in 
examining the totality of the circumstances. 
 
                         II. Jurisdiction 
 
     The bankruptcy court issued an order disposing of Mr. 
Lilley's Chapter 13 petition and the IRS's various challenges to 
it on May 3, 1995.  The IRS filed an appeal of the court's order, 
over which the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  158(a). 
     The district court issued its final order in the case on 
August 22, 1995.  We have jurisdiction over Mr. Lilley's appeal 
from the district court's order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291. 
     The issue presented on appeal is a question of law.  
Therefore, we exercise plenary review over the decision of the 
district court.  In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
                 III. The IRS's motion to dismiss 
 
     The district court, on appeal from the bankruptcy court 
order confirming Mr. Lilley's Chapter 13 plan, found that Mr. 
Lilley "attempted to defraud the Government by intentionally 
evading payment of his Federal income taxes and such action 
constitutes cause for dismissal of his Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C.  1307(c)."  Lilley III, 185 B.R. 
at 494.  We conclude that tax fraud is not "cause" for dismissal 
of a Chapter 13 petition, and therefore that the district court 
erred in reversing the bankruptcy court. 
     Section 1307(c) states, inter alia: 
          Except as provided in subsection (e) of this 
     section, on request of a party in interest or the 
     United States trustee after notice and a hearing, the 
     court . . . may dismiss a case under this chapter . . . 
     for cause, including-- 
               (1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is 
          prejudicial to creditors; 
               (2) nonpayment of any fees and charges 
          required under chapter 123 of title 28; 
               (3) failure to file a plan timely under 
          section 1321 of this title; 
               (4) failure to commence making timely 
          payments under section 1326 of this title; 
               (5) denial of confirmation of a plan under 
          section 1325 of this title and denial of a request 
          made for additional time for filing another plan 
          or a modification of a plan; 
               (6) material default by the debtor with 
          respect to a term of a confirmed plan; 
               (7) revocation of the order of confirmation 
          under section 1330 of this title, and denial of 
          confirmation of a modified plan under section 1329 
          of this title; 
               (8) termination of a confirmed plan by reason 
          of the occurrence of a condition specified in the 
          plan other than completion of payments under the 
          plan; 
               (9) only on request of the United States 
          trustee, failure of the debtor to file, within 
          fifteen days, or such additional time as the court 
          may allow, after the filing of the petition 
          commencing such case, the information required by 
          paragraph (1) of section 521; or 
               (10) only on request of the United States 
          trustee, failure to timely file the information 
          required by paragraph (2) of section 521. 
11 U.S.C.  1307(c). 
     It is an established rule of construction for bankruptcy 
statutes that "'includes' and 'including' are not limiting."  11 
U.S.C.  101(3).  See, e.g., P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 
69, 77 n.7 (1979) (noting that "including" indicates that 
enumerated items are part of larger group).  It is therefore 
beyond dispute that a court may consider matters other than those 
enumerated in section 1307(c) as grounds for dismissal of a 
Chapter 13 petition.  What is very much in dispute, however, is 
whether pre-petition tax fraud is one of the matters on which a 
court may base dismissal of a petition. 
     Mr. Lilley argues that it is not, and that accordingly we 
should reverse the district court's decision.  He first argues 
that tax liabilities which result from the debtor's attempt to 
defraud the government and from willful evasion are dischargeable 
under Chapter 13.  A review of the statutory scheme supports Mr. 
Lilley's claim. 
     The Bankruptcy Code allows the discharge after completion of 
all payments due under a Chapter 13 plan 
     of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed 
     under section 502 of this title, except any debt-- 
                            * * * * * 
               (2) of the kind specified in paragraph (5) or 
          (8) of section 523(a) or 523(a)(9) of this title; 
          or 
               (3) for restitution included in a sentence on 
          the debtor's conviction of a crime. 
11 U.S.C.  1328(a).  The language of this provision clearly 
indicates that the exceptions it contains are exclusive -- that 
is, that the courts are not to broaden the list of non- 
dischargeable debts in a Chapter 13 reorganization beyond those 
enumerated in section 1328(a). 
     Section 523(a)(1)(C), which is not among the enumerated 
exceptions contained in section 1328(a), refers to any debt "with 
respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully 
attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax."  11 U.S.C. 
 523(a)(1)(C). 
     Section 1328(a) and 523(a)(1)(C), read together, demonstrate 
Congress's intent that tax-related debts of the sort at issue 
here be dischargeable under Chapter 13, a conclusion which the 
IRS does not dispute.  See Appellee's Brief at 18 ("Congress has 
provided that in order to get a fresh start, debtors may obtain a 
discharge of certain taxes even where they have willfully 
attempted to evade payment of those taxes in the past."). 
     The agency's concession suggests that Mr. Lilley's tax fraud 
history cannot constitute "cause" for dismissal of his Chapter 13 
petition.  As he persuasively argues, 
     If Mr. Lilley is entitled to a discharge of the tax 
     liabilities created by his prepetition conduct upon the 
     completion of his Chapter 13 plan payments, then that 
     same prepetition conduct should not result in a 
     dismissal of his Chapter 13 case. 
Appellant's Brief at 10-11.   
     Predictably, the IRS rejects this conclusion and argues 
instead that  
     [b]y providing for a discharge under these 
     circumstances, however, Congress was not manifesting an 
     intent to allow the bankruptcy laws to be used as part 
     of debtor's grand scheme to evade the payment of his 
     taxes in order to obtain compensation from the United 
     States for the loss of his business where the law did 
     not otherwise provide compensation for such loss. 
Appellee's Brief at 18-19. 
     The government, however, offers no support for this 
proposition, other than one case from the Eleventh Circuit, In re 
Waldron, 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. dismissedsub nom. 
Waldron v. Shell Oil Co., 478 U.S. 1028 (1986), that is 
clearly distinguishable.  In the first place, Waldron involved 
not section 1307(c) but section 1325(a)(3), which articulates the 
good-faith test governing Chapter 13 plans.  Id. at 939.  More 
importantly, the court's ground for dismissal in that case was 
that the motivation behind the debtors' filing for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy was not that for which the statute was intended.  "The 
overriding purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to relieve debtors 
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and provide them with 
a fresh start."  In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995).  
In Waldron, however, the court concluded that   
     [t]he Waldrons have no debts; they are financially 
     secure. . . .  The Waldrons' plan was thus proposed in 
     a bad faith attempt to use and abuse Chapter 13 for a 
     greedy and unworthy purpose.  Congress could not have 
     intended such a result in enacting Chapter 13. 
In re Waldron, 785 F.2d at 940-41. 
     In contrast, Mr. Lilley has listed liabilities of $178,000 
and no assets in his bankruptcy schedules.  Lilley III, 185 B.R. 
at 492 n.7.  Unlike the Waldrons, he is clearly "financially 
distressed and ha[s a] real need for the bankruptcy process."  In 
re Waldron, 785 F.2d at 939.  Therefore, we find that Waldron is 
of no bearing in the instant matter, and that the government's 
position is without any support. 
     While Mr. Lilley does not offer any caselaw in support of 
his argument either, his argument is persuasive, especially in 
light of the established principle of statutory construction that 
we "read the disputed provision in the context of the entire 
statute."  Matter of Roach, 824 F.2d 1370 (3d Cir. 1987); seealso U.S. v. 
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) ("a 
statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that 
every word has some operative effect").  The same normative 
considerations regarding tax fraud are involved at the dismissal 
and discharge stages.  It is therefore wholly implausible that 
Congress would hold that the type of conduct in which Mr. Lilley 
admittedly engaged is so egregious as to warrant dismissal of his 
petition, but benign enough that the debt incurred as a result of 
this conduct would be dischargeable if no effort to dismiss his 
petition were made.   
     Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred when it 
dismissed Mr. Lilley's petition based on his prepetition conduct. 
     In its brief, the IRS suggested in the alternative that if 
we were to reach the conclusion that we do reach today regarding 
Mr. Lilley's conduct on tax matters, we should remand "for a 
determination whether debtor's petition was filed in bad faith."  
Appellee's Brief at 28.  This argument calls upon us to address 
an issue of first impression in this court: whether Chapter 13 
contains a good faith filing requirement.  The bankruptcy court 
concluded as a matter of law that Chapter 13 has no such 
requirement.  Lilley II, 181 B.R. at 811.  On appeal, the 
district court sidestepped the controversy, deciding the case on 
other grounds.  Lilley III, 185 B.R. at 493 n.10. 
     It is clear that Chapter 13 contains no explicit good faith 
requirement.  Section 1307(c) provides, however, that Chapter 13 
petitions may be dismissed "for cause."  11 U.S.C.  1307(c).  
The Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that lack of good 
faith in filing is sufficient cause for dismissal under section 
1307(c).  See In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992); In 
re Eisen, 14 F.3d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Gier, 986 F.2d 
1326, 1329-30 (10th Cir. 1993).  We agree.   
     As the Seventh Circuit has noted, however, "good faith is a 
term incapable of precise definition."  In re Love, 957 F.2d at 
1355.  As a result, we believe that "the good faith inquiry is a 
fact intensive determination better left to the discretion of the 
bankruptcy court."  Id.  We therefore join the Seventh, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits in holding that the good faith of Chapter 13 
filings must be assessed on a case-by-case basis in light of the 
totality of the circumstances.  In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1355; In 
re Eisen, 986 F.2d at 1329; In re Gier, 14 F.3d at 470.  Factors 
relevant to the totality of the circumstances inquiry may 
include, among others, the following: 
     the nature of the debt . . . ; the timing of the 
     petition; how the debt arose; the debtor's motive in 
     filing the petition; how the debtor's actions affected 
     creditors; the debtor's treatment of creditors both 
     before and after the petition was filed; and whether 
     the debtor has been forthcoming with the bankruptcy 
     court and the creditors. 
 
In re Love, 957 F.2d at 1357.  Accordingly, we will remand this 
matter to the district court with directions to remand to the 
bankruptcy court for a determination whether, in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Lilley filed his Chapter 13 
petition in good faith. 
      
                          IV. Conclusion 
 
     For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district 
court's holding regarding Mr. Lilley's prepetition conduct, and 
remand to the district court with directions to remand to the 
bankruptcy court to determine whether Mr. Lilley satisfied the 
good faith filing requirement of Chapter 13. 
 
 
 
